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THE ARAB FREE TRADE AREA
Amr Abbas*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE current era is characterized by the proliferation of regional
integration around the world. The Arab states initiated one of the
first attempts at an economic and political integration. These at-
tempts have not been successful for the Arab states. Many other regions
have enjoyed far more success despite their later integration attempts.
Several steps toward a free trade area were taken under the Arab
League (League), which was established in 1945. The Charter of the
League' (Charter) provides that one of the League's purposes is to pro-
mote economic and financial cooperation between Member States includ-
ing commercial relations and customs. 2
During the 1950s and 1960s, Arab politicians focused mainly on politi-
cal and military cooperation, rather than economic cooperation. Promot-
ing trade served as the primary means for economic integration. Several
treaties were signed to accomplish this purpose: (1) the Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation Treaty Among Member States of the League of
Arab States in 1950; (2) the Convention for Facilitating Trade and Regu-
lating Trade Transit in 1953; and (3) the Arab Economic Unity Agree-
ment in 1957. In addition, some attempts for Arab Common Market
took place in 1964.3
After the oil boom of the 1970s, the Arab region experienced more
capital flows and labour movements than trade. This led to the develop-
ment of other strategies for economic cooperation between the Arab
countries. One of these strategies consisted of joint projects with the par-
ticipation of Arab governments. 4
In the 1980s, Arab countries entered into many sub-regional agree-
ments. These agreements included the Gulf Cooperation Council, the
Arab Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union. Nonetheless,
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1. CHARTER OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, available at http://www.
arableagueonline.org/arableague/arabic/details ar.jsp?art_id=133&level_id=114#
(last visited Aug. 30, 2004) [hereinafter CHARTER].
2. Id. art. 11(1).
3. SAMIHA FAWZY, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION 3-4 (Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 66, 2002),
available at http://www.eces.org.eg/Publications/Index2.asp?Ll=4&L2=1&L3=1
(last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
4. Id. at 4.
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the increase in trade between these blocks was much less than the in-
crease in trade with countries outside the region. 5
In 1981, some members of the League entered into the Agreement to
Facilitate and Develop Inter-Arab Trade Area (FDATA),6 which focuses
its concern on merchandise trade. The FDATA does not provide for a
common market for services or investment, nor a custom union.7 No pro-
gress was made in implementing the FDATA until 1997, when it was re-
vived again and an executive program for implementation was created.
This article first discusses provisions of the FDATA and the executive
program. Then it focuses on the progress and the problems surrounding
its implementation.
II. PURPOSES OF THE FDATA
The FDATA aims to liberalize trade between Member States, in addi-
tion to protecting products produced in Member States from foreign
competition.8 The FDATA seeks to harmonize the production of goods
and trade between Member States.9 Further, it aims to facilitate the fi-
nancing of Arab trade and settlement of payments, and it gives special
concessions to services related to trade between Member States.10 The
FDATA promotes fair distribution of benefits and costs among Member
States.'1
III. METHODS OF LIBERALIZATION AND SETTLEMENT OF
PAYMENTS UNDER THE FDATA
The liberalization of trade between Member States of the FDATA was
to occur via two methods. The first method is recognized as the full liber-
alization method in which the FDATA exempts certain categories of
goods from all tariffs, similar taxes, and all other trade barriers.12 The
second method is known as the progressive liberalization method in
which Member States negotiate concessions to reduce tariffs on goods
with the purpose of reaching a zero tariff on all goods and eliminating all
other barriers to trade within a specific period agreed upon by the par-
ties. 13 The FDATA provides that Member States shall facilitate the fi-
5. Id.
6. Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Inter-Arab Trade Area, Feb. 27, 1981, availa-
ble at http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableaguc/arabic/details-ar.jsp?art-
id=349&levelid=110 [hereinafter FDATA].
7. BERNARD HOEKMAN & PATRICK MESSERLIN, INITIAL CONDITIONS AND INCEN-
TIVES FOR ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: CAN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY'S
SuCCEss BE EMULATED? 1 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
2921, 2002), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20935-wps2921.pdf (last
visited Aug. 30, 2004).
8. FDATA, supra note 6, art. I1 (1)(a)-(c).
9. Id. art. 11(2).
10. Id. art. II(3)-(4).
11. Id. art. 11(7).
12. Id. art. VI.
13. Id. art. VII(I)-(2).
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nance, credit, and payment for trade between Member States.1 4 The
Arab Monetary Fund serves to establish a system for settlement of pay-
ments that result from trade between Member States.15
IV. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL FUNCTIONS
The Economic and Social Council of the League (ESCL), which con-
sists of ministers of foreign and economic affairs of the Arab states, is
appointed to supervise the implementation of the FDATA. 16 The ESCL,
acting by a two-thirds majority of Member States, possesses numerous
functions in relation to the FDATA. The ESCL shall draft and issue col-
lective lists of goods that are exempted from tariffs and other barriers to
trade, and goods enjoying reductions on tariffs and other barriers to
trade.17 The ESCL shall draft and issue lists of non-Arab goods that are
competing with or are alternatives to Arab goods. The ESCL shall also
determine the rules and conditions to facilitate the progressive reduction
of tariffs and other similar taxes. 18 Further, the ESCL shall determine
which Member States are the less developed for purposes of the
FDATA. 19
The ESCL is also empowered to examine complaints of Member States
regarding the discrimination inflicted upon them by other Member States
while conducting commercial transactions. 20 Disputes arising from the
application of the FDATA shall be submitted to the ESCL for resolution.
The ESCL may assign the dispute to a committee and delegate a portion
of its powers to the committee. In every case, the ESCL shall decide the
method of adjudicating the dispute.21
V. PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FDATA AND FOR
ESTABLISHING AN ARAB FREE TRADE AREA
In 1997, the ESCL decided22 to implement an executive program (the
Program) to establish an Arab Free Trade Area (AFTA), in accordance
with provisions of the FDATA and the World Trade Organization Agree-
ment.2 3 The Program requires that the Arab Member States in the
FDATA complete the creation of the AFTA before January 1, 2008.24
The AFTA would eliminate all tariffs and similar taxes between Member
States.
14. Id. art. X(1),(3),(4).
15. Id. art. X(2).
16. Id. art. XI(1).
17. Id. art. XI(1)(a)-(b).
18. Id. art. XI (1)(d).
19. Id. art. XI (1)(e).
20. Id. art. XI (1)(f).
21. Id. art. XIII.




24. Id. art. 1(2)
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VI. REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINING THE PROGRAM AND
TIME FRAME
An Arab state must satisfy two conditions to join the Program. First,
an Arab state must ratify the FDATA. Second, an Arab state must agree
to the Program by depositing the local regulations issued instructing its
customs authority to apply the Program.2 5 By the end of 2002, there were
sixteen members to the Program. 26
The Program provides for the progressive liberalization of all goods
within ten years by reducing tariffs and other similar taxes by an equal
annual percentage until they are fully eliminated at the end of the ten
years.2 7 This requires an annual reduction of 10 percent. The ESCL later
opted for a shorter period ending in 2005.28 Accordingly, the annual re-
duction of the tariffs and similar taxes will be 20 percent in 2004 and 2005.
However, Member States may agree to immediate elimination of all tar-
iffs and other trade barriers for any imported goods. The basis for calcu-
lating the reduction of tariffs and similar taxes on imported goods shall be
those rates in effect on January 1, 1998.29 Any tariff reductions thereafter
shall be calculated on the latter reduction.3 0
The Program prohibits non-tariff barriers on Arab goods traded within
the framework of the Program.3 1 Non-tariff barriers are defined in the
FDATA as any measures taken to control imports, not including organi-
zational or statistical purposes. 32
The Program allows any two or more Member States to agree to accel-
erate the reductions of the custom duties between them in accordance
with articles 3 and 7 of the FDATA. 33 However, the Program deviates
from the FDATA by applying the progressive liberalization method on
goods that are exempted from custom duties under chapter 2, article VI
of the FDATA, such as agricultural products, animal products, and min-
eral and non-mineral raw materials. Presumably, the only way to reacti-
vate the FDATA is to apply the progressive liberalization method on all
goods and to ignore the full exemption method, thereby raising the issue
25. Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2000, at 188, available at http://
www.amf.org.ae/vArabic/storage/other/ECONOMIC%20DEPT/
JOINT%20REPORT/section13.pdf (last visited July 31, 2004) [hereinafter Joint
Arab Economic Report 20001.
26. These countries include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Qatar, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates. See Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report
2003, ch.12, at 1, available at http://www.amf.org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp (last vis-
ited Aug. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Joint Arab Economic Report 2003].
27. Program, supra note 22, art. 11(1).
28. Economic and Social Council of the League, Res. No. 1431, Feb. 2002, art. 1(1),
Ordinary Meeting No. 69, available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/
arableagueiarabic/details-ar.jsp?art id=1485&levelid=696.
29. Program, supra note 22, art. 1(7).
30. Id. art. 1(8).
31. Id. art. III.
32. FDATA, supra note 6, art. 1(6).
33. Program, supra note 22, art. 1(9).
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of amending the FDATA by the Program. The FDATA can only be
amended by the approval of two thirds of the Member States. 34 Al-
though the ESCL makes its decisions by a two-thirds majority, the
FDATA does not grant the ESCL the right to amend the FDATA.
VII. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO LEAST DEVELOPED
MEMBER STATES
The FDATA provides that development conditions of Member States,
particularly the least developed ones, shall be taken into account.35 Pref-
erential treatment shall be accorded to the least-developed Member
States. The ESCL shall determine the particular conditions of any prefer-
ential treatment granted. 36
The Program provides the same preferential treatment to both least-
developed Member States and Palestine. It requires least-developed
Member States to submit a request that includes the nature of the prefer-
ential treatment needed and the period for approval of the ECSL. Least-
developed Member States are those identified by the United Nations as
such. 37
Accordingly, least-developed Member States have until 2010 to abolish
fully all customs duties and other taxes and restrictions on Arab goods.
Sudan chose to start a 20 percent annual reduction beginning in 2005.38
VIII. RULES OF ORIGIN
The Program requires Member States to provide national treatment to
goods traded in accordance with the Program concerning: (1) rules of ori-
gin; (2) specifications and standards; (3) conditions for health and secur-
ity safeguards; and (4) local duties and taxes. 39 Lack of agreement on
rules of origin has delayed full implementation of the Program. Chapter
1, article IX of the FDATA provides general rules of origin for products
deemed produced in an Arab state. A product originates from a Member
State if the value added in the Member State is at least 40 percent of the
final value of the finished product. In assembly industries, this percent-
age is reduced to 20 percent. However, an agreement on detailed rules of
origin has yet to be reached because of problems between Arab states. 40
IX. REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL RULES
The Program's preamble refers to the World Trade Organization
Agreement (WTO Agreement) and its rules. Member States shall give
due regard to international rules concerning: (1) safeguard measures; (2)
34. FDATA, supra note 6, art. XXIV.
35. Id. art. 11(6).
36. Id. art. VII(3).
37. Program, supra note 22, art. VII.
38. Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, supra note 26, at 1.
39. Program, supra note 22, art. 1(4).
40. Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, supra note 26, at 2.
2004]
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antidumping measures; (3) measures to safeguard the balance of pay-
ments; and (4) subsidizing measures. 41 The Program does not specify the
international rules to which it refers. However, one may deduct from the
preamble that it refers to the WTO Agreement, which now claims eleven
Arab states as members.42
The FDATA provides that Member States shall negotiate unified mini-
mum custom duties and other taxes or restrictions on imports from non-
Member States that compete with imports from Arab states. These du-
ties shall be increased gradually. 43 The Program contains no reference to
such obligation. The incompatibility of the obligation to raise tariff duties
on goods imported from beyond the region with the WTO Agreement
and other international agreements to which Arab states are member jus-
tifies such omission.
X. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
The FDATA allows any Member State to request the imposition, on a
temporary basis, of tariff duties or similar taxes or quantitative or admin-
istrative restrictions, or retension of those already in effect, to protect the
growth of certain domestic production. Any such safeguard measure re-
quires ESCL approval, and the ESCL shall determine the period for such
measure. 44 The ESCL limited the Member State exception to a maxi-
mum of 15 percent of the value of exports from the Member State to
other Member States. Six members were granted approval to apply such
measures until September 16, 2002.45 The economic circumstances of
these countries provide justification for the exceptions, and give the
member countries the chance to adapt to the liberalization of trade
amongst Arab states. The value of the goods subject to exceptions by the
six Member States does not exceed 6 percent of the value of trade be-
tween Member States.46 Three of these Arab states have reportedly de-
posited regulations issued to their customs authorities abrogating the
exception. 47
XI. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS EXCEPTION
With regard to certain agricultural products, any Member State may
decide not to reduce tariff duties during certain seasons. A list of these
agriculture products and seasons must be communicated to the ESCL.
41. Program, supra note 22, art. 1(5)-(6).
42. These are Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. See World Trade Organization, Mem-
bers and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif-e/org6-e.
htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
43. FDATA, supra note 6, art. VIII.
44. Id. art. lXV.
45. These are Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. See Arab Mone-
tary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2002, at 191, available at http://www.amf.
org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
46. Id. at 192.
47. Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, supra note 26, at 2.
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This exception will no longer be available when the Program ends and the
AFTA is established. The agricultural products exception does not re-
quire approval by the ESCL.48 However, the ESCL has provided for cer-
tain limitations and criteria to be followed with respect to the agricultural
products exception. 49
As mentioned above, this framework is inconsistent with the FDATA's
exemption of agricultural products from all tariff duties. Arguably, arti-
cle XV of FDATA, which allows any Member State to request the reten-
tion or imposition of temporary custom duties or restrictions to protect
certain domestic production, provides an authority for such exception.
However, there are noticeable differences between the two exceptions.
First, the Program's agricultural products exception does not allow re-
strictions on imports, unlike the FDATA's exception. Second, the Pro-
gram's agricultural products exception has no condition for protecting the
growth of certain domestic production as in the FDATA's exception.
Third, the Program's agricultural exception does not require ESCL
approval.
XII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
All Member States have notified the League Secretariat concerning
their fulfilment of the obligation to reduce tariff duties according to the
Program timetable.50 However, most Member States have not given no-
tice of compliance in terms of other taxes on imported goods and other
non-tariff barriers. 51
One of the important elements for the success of a free trade area con-
tinues to be an effective mechanism to settle disputes between Member
States. The FDATA and the Program lack a binding dispute settlement
mechanism. Every Member State has established a point of contact for
inquiries regarding the application of the FDATA and the Program. Un-
til a dispute settlement system is established, these points of contact re-
ceive complaints from the private sector and Member States, and attempt
to resolve them. 52
As mentioned above, the ESCL has jurisdiction over disputes arising
from the application of the FDATA.53 The private sector has submitted
complaints to the ESCL regarding obstacles to trade between Member
States. These complaints have referred to incidents of non-application of
tariff reduction and non-recognition of certificates of origin, including the
certificates' contents. The Secretariat dealt with a portion of these com-
48. Program, supra note 22, art. II(2)-(3).
49. Joint Arab Economic Report 2000, supra note 25, at 191 (citing Resolution No.
1350, Dec. 2, 1998).
50. Id. at 190.
51. Id. at 190-91.
52. Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 2001, at 322-323, available at
http://www.amf.org.ae/vEnglish/default.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
53. FDATA, supra note 6, art. XIII.
2004]
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plaints by consulting with the relevant points of contact.54
A draft agreement for a dispute settlement mechanism, containing sev-
eral steps to follow to settle a dispute, has been prepared for the ESCL's
approval. First, the dispute shall be referred to the appropriate points of
contact for resolution. Second, if the points of contact fail to reach a
resolution, the dispute shall be resolved through conciliatory discussions.
Finally, the dispute is referred to an investment tribunal, whose ultimate
decision is final. The draft also provides a mandatory time limit for each
step.55
In the European integration example, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) played an important role in strengthening the system. The ECJ
rulings helped clarify the valid regulations and policies of the Member
States, and it set aside those that did not conform to the obligation to
liberalize trade. The ECJ rulings are binding and final on all Member
States.56 The ECJ distinguished between measures imposed for public
safety and health as opposed to those rulings that were protectionist,
which were set aside by the ECJ.57
XIII. SLOW PROGRESS IN THE ARAB INTEGRATION
The Arab region is among one of the least integrated regions in the
world with respect to capital and trade flows. 58 While the total exports
between Arab states have increased from 5.3 to 8.2 percent during 1970
to 1998, this is less than other free trade areas.59 Even capital flows be-
tween Arab countries never exceeded 2 percent (US $6 billion in the
1970s) of oil revenues.60 This may be a result of underdeveloped capital
markets, or it may emanate from the non-encouraging laws of Arab coun-
tries. On the contrary, other capital markets provide a better environ-
ment in which to invest, trade, and maximize profit while maintaining the
ability to diversify risks.61 Poor trade conditions could also be traced to
the political instability and ever-changing policies and regulations in the
economic arena in Arab countries.
It is notable that in Arab states, labour movements have been the most
active compared to capital and trade movements. This differs from other
regional integration models where the labour movement usually serves as
a last step. This result is based primarily on the existence of more restric-
tions on trade between Arab states than for labour movements. 62 It can
also be due to the common language, similar culture, and social traditions
between citizens of different Arab states. These elements are not rele-
54. Joint Arab Economic Report 2003, supra note 26, at 4.
55. Id. at 5.
56. BERNARD & MESSERLIN, supra note 7, at 5.
57. Id. at 11.
58. FAwzY, supra note 3, at 8.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. at 6-7.
62. Id.
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vant in trade and capital movements. However, the reasons for the slow
progress of the Arab region integration can be mainly traced to economic
and political reasons.
A. ECONOMIC REASONS
Some prerequisites for an economic integration are identified in the
standard customs union theory and the new regional integration theory.
This realization should result in the realization of mutual gains. 63 Certain
elements must be present to ensure mutual gains from the integration.
The economies of the Member States should serve to compliment one
another, which offers an opportunity for more trade creation. The size of
the market and the number of the states involved may have an impact by
offering more markets and hence more trade. Geographical proximity is
also important because it reduces transportation costs. In addition, the
openness of the market and the role of the private sector are important
factors in the integration process.64
With regard to how the Arab states compliment each other, some re-
search projects were conducted using a complementarity index for each
Arab state and the other Arab states. The complementarity index shows
the extent to which the structure of imports and exports in different coun-
tries match one another.65 These studies conclude that there is a lack of
complementarity in trade structures between most Arab countries com-
pared to other regional blocs. 66 Because Arab states have similar exports
and export markets, they compete with each other, which minimizes the
benefits of integration, as the comparative advantage arising from trading
in different goods is relatively small. 67
The size of the Arab market is limited. The GDPs of the FDATA
Member States are less than the GDP of Spain.68 There is also a problem
relating to the variations in the level of welfare between Arab states be-
cause of large differences in the per-capita income. The differences in
per-capita income in NAFTA and EU states amount to ten fold and five
fold respectively, while the difference between Arab countries is more
than twenty-one fold.69 This large disparity does not encourage economic
integration. Rich countries do not have incentive to share their wealth
and poor countries are afraid of the growing influence of the rich
countries.70
Although Arab states have geographic proximity, other obstacles di-
minish this benefit. These obstacles include high tariff duties, inadequate
infrastructure, and different means of transportation, all which increase
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. BERNARD & MESSERLIN, supra note 7, at 13.
68. Id. at 12.
69. FAwzy, supra note 3, at 10.
70. Id.
2004]
472 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
the cost of trade. 71 The high level of protection in Arab states does not
serve the integration plans. Despite many agreements to liberalize trade
between Arab states, the tariff duties are still higher than in non-Arab
regions. This creates opposition to the integration from industries bene-
fiting from the protection. 72
Non-tariff barriers and different administrative procedures in customs
authorities create an obstacle for integration. Many Arab states still re-
quire import licences for importing Arab goods. Some Arab states also
possess complicated banking procedures for financing and opening docu-
mentary credit for importing goods. Moreover, some Arab states have
laws that restrict importation of certain goods to protect their own do-
mestic production.73 Finally, the role of the private sector is marginal in
Arab states, as evidenced by the fact that there is no noticeable role for
the private sector in negotiations of Arab integration agreements.74
B. POLITICAL REASONS
There must be political support for an economic integration, including
a supranational institution and regional leaders. The political support will
usually result from the integration's political benefits, which do not
threaten existing political powers.75 It is suggested that because of the
weak economic gains expected from the Arab integration coupled with
the fear that the elite will lose their dominating role because of a political
integration following an economic one, there has not been a political
movement to integrate between Arab states. It has been noted also that
because the vast majority of Arab leaders are not freely elected, the inte-
gration does not provide them a means for staying in office. 76
A supra-regional institution is needed to serve as a forum for the meet-
ing of the region's leaders and to establish the integration rules and poli-
cies.77 Although there are many Arab organizations, they are ineffective.
These organizations lack the autonomous power to issue mandatory rules
and policies for the region and to supervise their implementation. 78 This
problem affects the League as well. The Charter fails to provide the
League with the ability to impose obligations on the Member States with-
out their consent. In contrast, in the European Community, the existence
of the European Commission as an independent supranational institution
played a critical role in the European integration. The European Com-
mission retains the right to suggest regulations and directives, which, if
approved, would directly affect the European Member States and prevail
on any national law. The European Commission maintains its own inde-
71. Id. at 11.
72. Id.
73. Joint Arab Economic Report 2000, supra note 25, at 194.
74. FAwzy, supra note 3, at 12.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. at 14.
78. Id. at 16.
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pendent staff supported in part by financing from common external tariff
duties. When Member States lacked enthusiasm, the European Commis-
sion defended and directed the path to integration.79
One or more members should be recognized as a regional leader(s).
The role of a regional leader is essential in coordinating the efforts of
different members and in solving differences and conflicting interests.80
Egypt formerly fulfilled this role until the late 1970s. However, almost all
Arab states have declared an economic and political boycott against
Egypt because of its participation in the Peace Treaty with Israel, and
neither Iraq, Saudi Arabia, nor Syria has successfully filled this position.8'
After the resumption of relations between the Arab states and Egypt, the
changes in the political architecture of the region and the world did not
allow Egypt to reassume fully its role as a political leader. There also
seems to be unwillingness from Arab states and reluctance from Egypt to
accept this role.
The absence of a system to compensate those negatively affected by the
Arab integration is also a reason for the slow progress in the Arab Free
Trade Area plans.82 In the European Community, several methods have
been employed to compensate those negatively affected. These solutions
varied between exceptions to trade liberalization, aid or subsidies to dis-
advantaged territories, soft loans by the European Investment Bank for
infrastructure and similar projects, and long transition periods.83 How-
ever, some mechanisms do exist in the FDATA and the Program to miti-
gate the losses. As mentioned above, general and specific exceptions to
liberalization are allowed. In addition, preferential treatment is granted
to the least developed Member States.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Some positive steps have been taken towards an Arab free trade area
and an economic integration. The implementation of the FDATA and
the Program is progress toward these goals. However, some issues are
still unsettled between Member States, such as rules of origin, a dispute
settlement mechanism, and non-tariff barriers to trade. The lack of qual-
ity political and economic requirements for integration is decreasing the
benefits of the integration and delaying the realization of the Arab eco-
nomic integration.
79. BERNARD & MESSERLIN, supra note 7, at 4.
80. FAwzY, supra note 3, at 14.
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id at 17.
83. BERNARD & MESSERLIN, supra note 7, at 5.
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